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LABOR LAW-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr-CoVERAGE OF CoNsTRucnoN 
WORKERS-Respondent construction firm was engaged in building a dam, 
the sole purpose of which was to enlarge a reservoir that supplied water to 
the city of Corpus Christi, Texas. Industrial producers of goods for inter-
state commerce and operators of instrumentalities of interstate commerce 
consumed nearly half of the water supplied by the city's system. The Secre-
tary of Labor sought an injunction against violations of the overtime pro-
visions of the Fair Labor Standards Act1 The district court granted the 
injunction; the court of appeals reversed,2 relying primarily upon the "new 
construction" doctrine. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, 
held, affirmed, four Justices dissenting. Although the new construction rule 
was not a proper basis upon which to deny coverage, construction workers 
in this case, nevertheless, were too remotely related to the production goods 
for interstate commerce to come within the scope of the act. .Mitchell v. 
H. B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310 (1960). 
The FLSA governs a segment of labor law in which Congress has chosen 
to exercise a jurisdiction less extensive than that available to it under the 
commerce clause.a Since the passage of the act in 1938, the courts have 
tended to expand the boundaries of its application. During the past 
seven years this has been particularly true in the construction industry. 
In the principal case, however, the Court takes a restrictive view of further 
expansion of federal wage and hour regulation. In doing so the Court com-
pletes the unfinished picture left in 1955 by its decision in Mitchell v. 
Vollmer! and clarifies the distinction between the two branches of coverage 
of individual workers: those engaged "in commerce" within the meaning of 
section 3(b) of the act and those employed "in the production of goods for 
commerce" under section 3 G). 
The distinction between these two branches is central to the history of 
the application of the FLSA. Early litigation under the act dealt primarily 
with the more general "production" wording of section 3 (j) and resulted 
152 Stat. 1061 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1958). 
2 H.B. Zachry Co. v. Mitchell, 262 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1959). 
a Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942) (dictum). 
4 349 U.S. 427 (1955). 
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in the extension of coverage to employees connected by an indirect causal 
relationship to interstate operations.5 On the other hand, "in commerce" 
coverage was at first limited to operational employees immediately con-
cerned with the movement of goods.6 Then, in Overstreet v. North Shore 
Corp.,7 the Court drew upon an old Federal Employers' Liability Act de-
cision8 to extend "in commerce" coverage to maintenance employees. In one 
respect this proved an unfortunate importation, for within FELA juris-
prudence was a doctrine, resulting from a narrow interpretation of the 
commerce clause, that construction of new facilities did not come within 
the reach of Congress before the facilities were actually placed in service.9 
Through Overstreet, this "new construction rule" became embedded in the 
FLSA decisions of the lower courts as a limitation on the scope of the phrase 
"in commerce.''10 By further importation, the rule also became a limitation 
on "production of goods" coverage.11 
In 1955 Mitchell v. Vollmer12 summarily dismissed the new construction 
rule as belonging to "another vintage." This decision was the culmination 
of a gradual expansion of application of the FLSA to construction ac-
tivities. Expansion had followed two routes: first, an attempt to use the 
broader concept of "production of goods" to reach suppliers of construc-
tion materials for transportation facilities;13 and, second, examination of 
the degree of integration which a facility under construction would have 
with existing facilities when completed rather than during its construc-
tion,u a technique built upon the traditional "improvement" exception 
li E.g., Kirschbaum v. Walling, supra note 3, at 524, in which the Court held that 
operating and maintenance employees of the owner of a loft building, space in which was 
rented to persons producing goods principally for interstate commerce, performed work 
"necessary to the production of goods for commerce." 
6 Higgins v. Carr Bros., 317 U.S. 572 (1943); Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 
U.S. 564 (1943); Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572 (1942). 
7 318 U.S. 125 (1943). 
s Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 229 U.S. 146 (1913). 
o Raymond v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 243 U.S. 43 (1917). 
10 E.g., Van Klaveren v. Killian-House Co., 210 F.2d 510 (5th Cir. 1954); Scholl v. 
McWilliams Dredging Co., 169 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1948); Nieves v. Standard Dredging Co., 
152 F.2d 719 (1st Cir. 1945). The Supreme Court impliedly recognized the doctrine in 
Fitzgerald Co. v. Pedersen, 324 U.S. 720 (1945). Construction workers were given special 
treatment in Murphy v. Reed, 335 U.S. 865 (1948). Mr. Justice Rutledge's partial dissent 
shows that some consideration was given to the status of new construction at that time. 
11 E.g., Spencer v. Porter, 183 F.2d 445 (8th Cir. 1950); Parham v. Austin Co., 158 F.2d 
566 (5th Cir. 1946); Hartmaier v. Long, 361 Mo. 1151, 238 S.W.2d 332, cert. denied, 342 
U.S. 833 (1951). For an extreme example of differentiation between the "in commerce" 
and tl1e "production of goods" phraseology, see Schroeder v. Clifton, 153 F.2d 385 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 858 (1946), holding disapproved, H.R. REP. No. 1453, 81st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1949). 
12 Supra note 4, at 429. 
13Alstate Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953); Thomas v. Hempt, 345 U.S. 19 
(1953); Tobin v. Johnson, 198 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 915 (1953). 
14 l\litchell v. Chambers Constr. Co., 214 F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1954); Bennett v. V. P. 
Loftis Co., 167 F.2d 286 (4th Cir. 1948); Walling v. McCrady Constr. Co., 156 F.2d 932 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 785 (1946); Walling v. Patton-Tulley Transp. Co., 134 
F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1943). 
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to the new construction doctrine. The Vollmer decision followed the latter 
of these two approaches. It did not categorically abolish the new construc-
tion exception to coverage;15 rather, it expanded the test of integration 
with existing facilities to a point where little construction "in commerce" 
could be imagined which would be sufficiently independent to be "new.''16 
Vollmer did not make clear whether its broader concept of integration 
would also be applicable to "production of goods" litigation, the older 
arena of FLSA contention in which integration with existing facilities is a 
far less frequent factor and into which the new construction doctrine en-
tered only indirectly from the FELA decisions. Unlike the expanding 
"in-commerce" jurisdiction, the once-broader section 3 G), "production of 
goods," branch was restricted in 1949 by an amendment which substituted 
"directly essential" for "necessary" in describing the relationship between 
covered activities and the production for commerce itself.17 The Court had 
not previously dealt with this amendment.1s 
Dictum in the Zachry decision appears to confirm the thesis that Vollmer 
destroyed the new construction rule. At the same time, however, when 
coverage is predicated on section 3 G), the fact that the activities involve 
construction remains a relevant factor in determining the issue of remote-
ness within the 1949 amendment.19 In essence, the Court in Zachry confirms 
the "factor" approach suggested by the Wage and Hour Administrator.20 
The facts of the principal case indicate that three factors will be particularly 
important in predicting coverage: (1) Whether the facility is to be used 
"in commerce" or for "the production of goods for commerce.'' If the 
former, the construction is one degree more closely related to commerce 
proper. Moreover, the restrictive effect of the 1949 amendment is not en-
countered. There is no reason to doubt that the expanding coverage in-
dicated by Vollmer21 will continue in this area. However, it appears that 
15 But see Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo, 351 U.S. 493, 500 (1956) (dictum). 
16 E.g., new buildings to house radio guidance systems are integrated with the existing 
system of aerial navigational aids. Mitchell v. Southwestern Eng'r Co., 170 F. Supp. 310 
(W.D. Mo. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 271 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1959). Cf. Archer v. 
Brown & Root, Inc., 241 F.2d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 1957). The verbal formula for determining 
jurisdiction in relation to commerce, "so closely related to it as to be practically a part of 
it," has remained unchanged since Shanks v. Delaware, L. 8: W.R.R., 239 U.S. 556, 558 
(1916) (FELA case). Compare McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 497 (1943), and 
Mitchell v. Vollmer, supra note 4. 
17 63 Stat. 911 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1958). In interpreting this legislation, the 
majority in Zachry rely primarily on the House managers' report, H.R. REP. No. 1453, 
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). The Senate managers did not join in this report, but rather 
filed a separate report after the Senate had passed the bilJ, 95 CoNG. REc. 14875 (1949), on 
which the Zachry dissent places more emphasis. 
18 Maneja v. Waialua Agricultural Co., 349 U.S. 254 . (1955), would have denied 
coverage even without the 1949 amendment. 
19 This method of dealing with construction activities was foreseen in '\VECHT, 'WAGE-
HouR LAw, COVERAGE 252 (1951). 
20 29 C.F.R. § 776.17 (c) (2) (Supp. 1960). 
21 Supra note 4. Mitchell v. Lublin M,'cGaughy, 358 U.S. 207 (1959), ilJustrates a 
more recent application of this approach. 
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not all facilities furnishing support to interstate instrumentalities will them-
selves be considered "in commerce" and therefore subjected to federal wage 
and hour regulation, for in Zachry the Court attaches little weight to the 
fact that the water was to be used to a small extent by railroads, airlines, 
and other instrumentalities of commerce. On the other hand, if the facility 
under construction is to be used for "the production of goods for com-
merce," Vollmer dictates that construction alone does not preclude coverage 
of activities; rather, the interaction of remaining factors will govern the 
degree of remoteness from commerce. (2) The number of steps separating 
the completed facility from "the production of goods for commerce." The 
dam under construction in Zachry would, inter alia, support factories. Still 
undecided is the degree of remoteness involved in the construction of 
factories themselves, an activity that is one step closer to commerce proper 
3 than the Zachry dam. The administrator continues to refuse to regard the 
fact that construction is "new" as in itself determinative of coverage.22 The 
only recent case found in point23 proceeds upon the theory that Vollmer 
dealt only with "in-commerce" construction activities; this interpretation 
was invalidated by Zachry. In place of the indiscriminate "new-construc-
tion" test, it is submitted that the issue of "remoteness" raised now in the 
Zachry approach should be judged by balancing the degree to which the 
wage and hour policy followed during its construction is reflected in the 
pricing of a finished product in interstate competition, against the undesir-
able interference with a local labor market which is likely to result from 
federal regulation. (3) The relation of the completed facility to existing 
units or facilities. Under the traditional new construction doctrine, the dam 
in the principal case might have been classed as improvement of the existing 
reservoir.24 However, with the disappearance of that doctrine, whether the 
thing constructed is totally new, an improvement, or a replacement be-
comes merely another factor to consider in determining remoteness. Zachry 
distinguishes construction from repair, noting that the latter is more 
nearly an integral part of operation. Nevertheless, the Court appears to 
leave open the possibility that even repair might be considered non-
covered employment in some projects distantly related to commerce; the 
Court assumes only "arguendo that maintenance and repair of the com-
pleted dam would be covered employment .... "25 Two questions of degree 
are relevant: how radically is the existing facility changed, and how im-
mediate is the effect of wage and hour policy on the price of an eventual 
product? Closely related is the contention, argued and rejected in a 
district court,20 that integration is not to be defined in mere physical terms, 
22 29 C.F.R. §§ 776.26, !2.7 (c) (1) (Supp. 1960). 
2S Mitchell v. Tune, 178 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Ark. 1959). 
24 Walling v. Mccrady, supra note 14. 
25 Principal case at 319. But see 29 C.F.R. § 776.27 (a) (Supp. 1960) and Farmers 
Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949). 
26 Mitchell v. Tune, supra note 23. 
320 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
but should also include planned use of the completed facility in an existing 
physically-diversified complex of production plants performing steps in the 
manufacture of a product for commerce. It is possible, of course, that this 
issue would never be reached, for construction of a primary facility of pro-
duction might itself be covered. If such construction is not automatically 
covered, then the degree of integration with a production sequence would 
also be a factor to consider in determining remoteness within the act's 
"production of goods" language. 
The construction industry represents a particularly complex area for 
the application of principles of federalism to labor law. In 1957 FLSA 
covered less than half of all construction workers.27 However, covered and 
non-covered construction activities are closely related because of the 
pattern of employee mobility and area-wide collective bargaining between 
associations of diversified contractors and individual construction unions.28 
As a result of these special circumstances, federal regulation of some projects 
has a more direct effect on other purely local practices than it might if there 
were a more stable employment pattern. This situation justifies the un-
willingness of the Court to abandon entirely the differential treatment 
which in the past has been accorded the construction industry. The general 
approach taken by the majority in Zachry appears to call for a balancing of 
federal and state interests, with greater weight given to the states' interests 
than would be required by the Constitution. Liberal interpretation of the 
commerce clause has furnished a vehicle for assertion of broad federal power 
in the general field of labor regulation; any attempt to preserve a role for 
the states must rest on congressional legislation, and more particularly on 
judicial policy operating within necessarily broad legislative mandates.20 
Perhaps the principal case represents a guidepost for a more precise judicial 
definition of a balanced federal-state relationship in labor law.so 
David G. Davies 
27 1,293,000 of a total of 2,909,000 construction workers were covered, according to 
figures compiled from Wage and Hour Division sources. Hearings on S.25 [et al.] Before 
the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public JVelfare, 86th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1959). 
28 Covington, Union Security Elections in the Building and Construction Industry 
under the Taft-Hartley Act, 4 IND. 8: LAB. REL. R.Ev. 543, 546-48 (1951). 
29 Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1297, 1347 (1954). 
Wage and hour regulation is less subject to the criticism of an imbalance between federal 
and state power than other more critical fields of labor legislation for several reasons: 
First, the choice is between federal law and either complementary state law or no state law 
at all, not between conflicting solutions. Professor Cox's recognition of the unfortunate 
equation of states' rights with inaction, id. at 1302, 1346, is particularly appropriate. 
Second, since the FLSA is administered by both federal and state courts and affords 
private remedies, there is little problem of the administrative over-expansion experienced 
in the early days of the NLRB, id. at 1300. Third, an objective of federal wage and hour 
legislation is to affect indirectly conditions in non-covered areas. Scrupulous delineation 
of federal and state domains serves only to delay the impact of federal standards upon the 
latter. 
so In 1960 Congress considered legislation that would have affected coverage of the 
Fl.SA in the construction industry. S. 3758, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), proposed by 
